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IBSEN'S "LIFE-FORMS"
BY R. PETSCli
THE deep misunderstanding to which Ibsen was exposed by his
contemporaries, and from which his work suffers even today,
did not arise from the difficulty of the problems treated, nor from
his new and peculiar technique ; though criticism was directed
mainly against these points. In reality something else aroused oppo-
sition : Ibsen had outrun his contemporaries to such an extent, and
his ways were of such a singular kind, that very few could follow
him into the mysterious depths from which sprang his "presenta-
tion of characters and destinies of men." If every genuine work
of art down to its smallest details claims to be an expression of an
artistically grasped experience, and further, if this experience in
subject, extent, kind and intensity is anchored in the whole per-
sonality of its creator, then the beholder must enter completely into
his personality in order to view through his eyes that portion of the
world and human life which he has seen and projected. No research
into sources however carefully carried out ; no establishment of bio-
graphical and actual facts (the perception of which in itself is not
yet an experience) ; no analysis of composition and style; no evalu-
ation according to sacred aesthetic standards or moral and religious
ideal concepts brought from without are of any avail here.
"Down into the depths you must descend
If the essence you would comprehend."
Equally of no avail are descriptions or causal explanations in the
mechanistic sense, and the burdensome transference of its methods
to things of the spirit. What alone matters is the technique of
"understanding" such as was first applied in the days of German
idealism, perhaps rather intuitively, by Wilhelm von Humboldt, and
which has lately been developed to perfection by Wilhelm Dilthey
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and by his eminent, and logically far more astute, successor—Eduard
Spranger. It is above all to Spranger that we owe the most impor-
tant categories for the comprehension of spiritual differences which
do not allow themselves to be grasped by investigation from with-
out. Xo collection of biological facts and psycho-physical forms
of action and reaction, however complete, lead us to the core of
another's personality. What alone avails is intuitive comprehension
of the ultimate impulsive forces in their fundamental tendency and
inborn pov/er, and in their interconnectedness and strength relation-
^hips. The only thing that helps is penetration into the depths of
the microcosm which reflects the whole world, but always with a
particular accentuation of values that is significant of the individual.
Into these depths we can penetrate by way of an artistic intuition
alone; yet w^e need not fear that, therefore, we shall necessarily fall
into an arbitrary and purely fantastic interpretation of another's
life according to our own. The investigator, as well as the investi-
gated, is a microcosm and contains all human possibilities, only with
a different accentuation of value. Therefore what will first be
accessible lo him in another's personality, and what will arrest him
in it, will be that which corresponds to his own value-pattern. The
more profound, liberal, astute, educated and practised the observer
is, the more will he get into touch with the observed personalitv and
comprehend it according to his own life-laws, not as a fixed rigid
quantity, but as an entelechy ever revealing itself in the stream of
life and growth as a functional unity striving after an inherent
aim. It is true that we cannot in a rational and scientific way grasp
this unity in its manifold strivings and currents, in acts and expe-
riences ; much less can we determine its development beforehand.
Nevertheless we can penetrate far into the "total structure" of the
personality if we call to our aid the structure of reality accessible to
all. For what presents itself to our eyes is only the reflection, the
"objectivation," of spiritual strivings which sometimes are repre-
sented by an incalculable group of human beings, all akin to each
other in their fundamental tendency and all severally striving to
realize certain values, though by infinitely diverse ways and in im-
measurably varied conditions. These values may be classified with
comparative accuracy. To each of these classes of values corre-
sponds a particular section of reality in which it realizes itself.
Naturally, we may only define such sections sharply for the purposes
of preliminary investigation : they are "object-strata" to each of
which corresponds a particular domain in each human individual
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and ego-circle. Every man has part in all these circles, and so ha?
relations with all object-strata; but in everyone some ego-circle pre-
dominates strongly according to the special values which he in him-
self accentuates in all experiences. Thus the individual fits into
a "life-form" corresponding to his fundamental trend, and within
this he tries to realize the direction of his value. This is Eduard
Spranger's doctrine of Lchensformen} developed in a scientific
work of extraordinary depth, admirable breadth, and of rare charm,
of presentation. He distinguishes three individual "fundamental
types of individuality" : the theoretical, the economic, and the aes-
thetic man. In addition he distingiiishes two collective forms : the
social man, and the man of power ; and, finally, a form comprising
all these : the total form of existence, the religious man. There can
be no question of an ethical "life-form" which could be co-ordinated
with the others, as there would be no object-strata corresponding
to it. Ethical life is merely a special kind of behavior towards
values generally, and changes in so much as we gauge values accord-
ing to their significance and application as related to the structure
of the valumg personality ; an ethical man in a positive sense is he
who in a conflict between values always gives preference to the
higher or highest value. All valuing in this sense strives towards
a final condition in which the conflict of values is overcome and in
which the valuing ego merges into the absolute personality, i. e., the
religious life- form, the idea of which Friedrich Brunstad has lately
developed with commendable clearness and comprehensiveness in
a thoughtful book.^ With the help of this theory it is easier for us
to do justice to the leading men of history and especially of spiritual
history ; also to such complicated, and at first sight difficult, charac-
ters as Rousseau, Nietzsche, Tolstoy and Henrik Ibsen. Only, one
must not forget that none of these personalities represent absolutely
any one "life-form," quite apart from the fact that in each living
micrcosm all other possibilities are at least potentially present. For
instance, in very thinker there also lives something of an artist
though a stunted one, and also something of an economist : very
often, too, the proper life-form is hidden by one superimnosed
through an enforced vocation leading in another direction. Often,
too, we perceive a tension between different tendencies, one of
which corresponds to the core of the personality but which tries to
^Eduard Spranger : Lchcnsformcn. Gcistcswisscnschaftliche Psvchologie
und Ethik der Pcrsonlichkcif. 3 Aufl. Halle A. S. M. Niemeyer, 1922.
2 Friedrich Brunstad: Die Idee der Religion. Pr'mcipien der Religions-
philosophie. Halle a. S. Niemeyer, 1922.
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"express" itself in another life-form. Thus there are countless com
plications. In this consists the extraordinary charm and fertility
of Spranger's method, which demonstrates only the fundamenta
traits, possibilities of development, and complications of life-forms
but could not, and did not attempt to, penetrate into the ultimate
abyss of individual personality. Spranger's procedure is that of £
strictly methodical science, whereas ultimately the individual ij
"inexpressible" for the rational observer {rndividuum est iiicffabile)
and its comprehension is the task of an artistic "community of per
ception." From this point of view a host of questions concerning
Ibsen and his art are answerable. Is he really a poet ? Did he se(
living people, achieve an intimate relation with them, and form therr
into living characters? Or are they merely pawns in a game oi
chess, mere embodiments of concepts? Are they just dramas, as ha^
been asserted, little ethical tracts in the form of dialogues, or abor
tions of a pessimistic mood? Ibsen has explicitly on all occasions
and not only in connection with Rosmcrshohn, laid emphasis on thii
view : "Above all this is a poem of men and women and human
fate." As poet and creative artist he behaves, or at least tries to
in a purely aesthetic way. But this is not to say that the fundamen-
tal tendency of his character leads him in this direction. On the
contrary, already on the 12th of September. 1865, he had written
to Bjornson,'' saying that "he had now expelled the aesthetic from
himself, just as formerly it had power over him as an isolated thing
claiming to have a value in itself." With disgust he turned from i
Copenhagen aesthete who saw in Christ only the "most interesting
phenomenon of the world's history," and who enjoyed him "as the
glutton enjoys the sight of an oyster." Thus Ibsen lacks the pas-
sion" of a born aesthete, and from the outset we may assume that
his artistic activities, to which no doubt he brought rare gifts, were
only a secondary form of expression for his personality, a kind ol
auxiliary and substitute form for a mode of work which perhaps
would have corresponded better to his most innermost being, bul
which through unfavorable circumstances was denied to him. Bui
what other life-form must we consider? Hasty judges might main
tain the theoretical. But Ibsen has not the passionless, unpreju
diced, balancing nature of a thinker who is indififerent to response
and acceptance. For that, the fighter is too strong in him, hij
thoughts too contradictory, too much dominated by emotional accents
and too fantastic. Certainly Ibsen had a lively interest in philosophi
86 THE OPEN COURT
cal subjects—amongst others for Hegel's conception of history:^
but of a purely intellectual penetration and comprehension of life
there is no question in his case. Quite unquestionable is his ethical
behavior; but this corresponds, as was shown, with no particular
life-form, though it can lead us to the right track. Ibsen has his
whole heart in ethical valuation and in composing poetry. And just
as he does not write poetry in order to create anything lasting, in the
possession of which to enjoy himself, still less does he do so in
order to conform to any particular aesthetic type. He writes in
order to taste the joy of creating. He lives with his characters till
they make him "nervous" when he takes leave of them, only to have
soon again a feeling of emptiness which drives him to "new fren-
zies." ^ No more will he have anything to do with traditional and
formulated teachings, either religious or moral ; nay, every truth
becomes suspect in his eyes the moment it can be formulated. Thus
he soon confronts every character he created, and to which he had
just been saying "yes,"' with the annihilating smile of the sceptic,
and pushes on just when the masses he has been castigating and
shaking up, think they have reached his "standpoint" and become
his equal." Onward, over the bodies of the dead, this full-blooded
egoist points the way," not over the corpses of people but of con-
quered idols and ideals to ever new values, ever new changes and
developments, victories and liberations. Ibsen, in common with
every born moralist, has the pathos of valuing, re-valuing and con-
tinuous striving after higher values. The grouping of his charac-
ters, as well as the inner dialectic of his dramas and the totality of
their sequence, rests just on this. But what is, for him, the high-
est and last value? On January 3rd, 1882. Ibsen wrote to Brandes:
".
. . for me freedom is the highest and first condition of life."
But this freedom is not to be taken in the sense of any political
party, nor in that of Socialism. Any democratic levelling is hateful
to him. Fall of sure sympathy for worker and for woman, both of
whom are fighting for their freedom, and who, once liberated, seem
to ofifer the highest security for a better future, he yet does not want
to hear of any real endeavors towards emancipation. On February
^ Letter to Bjornson. Kristensen, 13 Feb., 1887.
* In his letter to G. Brandes of April 30th, 1873, he criticizes "The writers
who write about philosophy without knowing anything about Hegel or German
science."
'' Comnare the letters to Th. Caspari of June 27th, 1884. with those from
Hegel of September 2. 1884, and to M. Prozor of November 20th, 1890.
« Cf. his letter to G. Brandes of June 12th, 1883.
^ Cf. his letter to G. Brandes of September 24th, 1871.
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17th. 1871, he wrote to G. Brandes : "What they call freedom. I call
liberties, and what I call the fight for freedom is nothing less than
the steady living acquisition of the freedom-idea. He who possesses
freedom in any other way than as something to be striven for. pos-
sesses freedom dead and without spirit ; for the concept of freedom
has the quality of expanding while it is being acquired ; and if any-
one stands still during the fight and says. "Now I have it," he shows
that he has lost it. It is just this dead fixed freedom standard
which is characteristic of Hate societies, and that is what I meant
when I said it was no good." The fight will remain as long as there
are human beings conscious of their dignity. "Conflict is good, fresh,
and healthy." ® said Ibsen once, and in this he approaches Lessing
closely. It is a struggle for an ultimate good, one which consumes
and renews itself continuously, one which ever moves on and tempts
you from a distance, and yet remains the same fundamentally ; some-
thing which is not put into man from without, but which is given
with human nature itself. The freedom of the individual which
Ibsen strives for is only an ever stronger development according to
itself, the working out of its own soul-structure as it expresses itself
in the deepest needs of personality. That means that every one of
us has nothing better and nothing else to do than "to realize oneself
in spirit and in truth." ^ "To realize oneself in one's conduct of
life, that 's in my opinion the highest that man can attain. This
task we all have, but most of us bungle it." ^° Clearly this is the
fundamental reason of Ibsen's flight into the country, of his volun-
tary solitude ; it was to save his soul from perdition through con-
siderations for friends and strangers. In "friends" he saw but a
costly luxury demanding sacrifice at the expense of our personal-
ity.^^ At first sight this ethic might appear purely formalistic ; in
truth it is just as "material" as that of Max Scheler which also is
based on che principle of personalism.^- To perceive one's own in-
ner structure and to work out one's inherent tendencies and aims is
itself a content of life worth the sweat of the noble—compared to
which all the special aims towards which particular tendencies of
the soul reach out. crossing and supporting each other, are of mere
" Letter to Brandes, April 4th, 1872.
" Letter to Th. Caspari, June 27th, 1884.
i'^ Letter to Bj. Bjornson, August, 1882.
11 Letter to G. Brandes, March 6th, 1870.
12 Cf. M. Scheler, Dcr Fonnalistmis in der Ethik mid die materiale Werk-
rthik. neuer Versuch der Grundlegung eines cthischcn Pcrsonalismus, 2. Anfl.
Halle A. S. Niemeyer, 1921. One of the most eminent philosophical works
produced in recent years.
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secondary importance, as being (so to speak) mere means to the
highest aim. To remain master of oneself in spite of the pressure
which the various tendencies exercise, to order one's whole life
according to one's own laws, to bring to realization the particular
strata and combination of various value-tendencies significant of
the ego, to hold the reins continuously, and to rule with superior
force and foresight—it is in this that the born master-nature reveals
itself. It is the "political" man in the purest and noblest sense of
the word—which does not mean that he need be a professional poli-
tician. On the contrary, he may turn with disgust from the political
life of today. Amongst the life-forms which Spranger presents tJ
us, none corresponds better to Ibsen's innermost nature than that
of the master man ; this form can quite well coexist with his strong
educating love for human beings as bearers of high values, and for
brothers chosen as kings like himself.
It has been rightly said that in every tragic hero and heroine of
Ibsen there lies hidden a fallen king, an overturned queen, in fact
a "bungled" master-nature that has allowed itself to be led from its
path. From its path ! Not from a "right" path, a path right for
everyone. In Emperor and Galileaji Ibsen places Cain's fratricide
and Judas' betrayal as actions of bitter necessity : they acted as they
had to and their actions were necessary in the composition of the
whole. Had they acted differently, they would have "sinned"
towards themselves and towards their destined tasks. If a curse lay
.on their deed, they had to take it upon them ; for to that end the
curse lay in the path of their life. That is what is meant by "taking
one's fate into one's hands." In this the highest moral courage is
required : not presumptuous courage which wants to set itself above
all restraints, and which desires to "live itself out" in the sense of
Peer Gynt ("live for yourself") ; nor the cowardice of him who
bows to every alien law : nor the half courage of those who "doubt
their own doubts," who go along their own way for a little while
and then break down, who sway between sham freedom and intensi-
fied slavery. It requires the full manly courage which dares to fail
;
which treads its path with a "robust conscience" when a thousand
external and internal things say "no" : when happiness in a "human"
sense, public reputation, and "peace" break down over it ; and when
the actor must appear to himself and others as a criminal ofifender
towards sacred traditions. That is the colossal courage of Brand
with his "Live thyself" ; of whose tragic one-sidedness, of whose
monstrous misunderstanding of the religion of mercy, of whose
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capacity for resistence towards life, the poet was as much convinced
as any of his readers and spectators.
The ultimate ideal cannot be put into dry words, nor can it be
caught by a philosophical formula: it remains experience and fan-
tasy and can only be represented by ever new fantasies ; ever new,
because every representation, with the colors and forms of reality,
labors under the necessary limitations of all given individual and
empirical conditions, and these of necessity lack something of that
unconditioned and universal character which the "ideal" demands.
Hence the inner dialectic of the great "process of objectivation"
which is represented by Ibsen's dramas in their entirety. The gift
of perceiving his own experience as something detached from his
soul, and of letting others see it thus, was brought to him in his
cradle ; it is the gift of the poet. But in no one figure does the
experience emerge quite clearly and in the complete fullness of its
radiations ; so. from drama to drama it is re-examined and contem-
plated from different aspects, and thus ever more sharply, ever
more deeply, perceived. At least, that is the ideal direction in which
Ibsen's poetical art moves. The changes, the gradual development
and refinement of his craftsmanship serve too this purpose. Thus,
in Ibsen, art is only a means to an end, never an end in itself ; but,
the end in itself was not one which had necessarily to point away
from the aesthetic path. Ibsen does not want to propound a mate-
rial doctrine or represent such in model pictures ; but he wants to
show man in conflict, in apostasy, in collapse, and in purification
—
and this is the object of his aesthetic perception. Logical dialectic
above all stands in the service of that grand "irony" with which
Ibsen aims again at a plus ultra after every achieved presentation
;
and which he reaches not through intellectual, but through artistic
creative means. His intellect, too, stands absolutely at the service
of his artistic work.
Ibsen's acquired and considered knowledge also enters into the
service of the ultimate human ideal as perceived by him. His poeti-
cal expression of this ideal was never shaped perfectly because it
never corresponded completely to his personal structure which was
set on conflict and development and never could give itself to a
goal once it had been attained. He, too. pursued here the path
which his nature indicated to him with individual courage and with
the utmost tenacity. Rut Ibsen would not have been the artist he
was if he had not felt impelled for once to envisage human society
as a whole, from the point of view of the personal ideal as w'orked out
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by every individual. Also he would not have had in his make-up
so much of the religious life-form as every man undoubtedly has,
and as the poet of Brand most certainly had, if in moments of the
greatest excess of energy he was not to feel forced to contemplate
the individual from the point of view of the whole—that is, in the
light of thai totality the experiencing of which, according to Spranger,
forms the basis for the religious behavior of man and provides the
means for its fruition. It is clear that he could not stop at a mere
addition of the immeasurable wealth of inherent and lived laws of
the self. There was bound to be a still higher value in which they
all met, and in which all life-forms would find their unification. Now
in Ibsen's time Spranger's classification of all possibilities was un-
known. The secular conceptions of history and of people were
still too strongly tinged by mediaeval dualism and by German ideal-
ism from Schiller to Hegel, to allow a reconciliation between "both"
possible forms of humanity. "Between happiness of the senses and
peace of soul, man only has anxious choice," complained Schiller
;
and, in the main, unity is reserved for divinity. Only in exalted
moments of blissful perception does man achieve aesthetically that
unity to which his nature points. The lasting condition of the "beau-
tiful soul" is an ideal unattainable on earth. As long as we are in
the flesh there will remain two fundamental tendencies : sensuality
which enjoys, and morality which renounces. Schiller recognized
(though he was not the first) that the one life-form was represented
in Greek civilization, the other in Christianity. His regrets for the
vanished "Gods of Greece" ceased early; and he maintained, also
against Humboldt, that Hellenic "beauty" was purchased by a great
lack of spirituality and conscious morality. These were the historic-
philosophical constructions such as were current in Germany after
Lessing: and it was his Education of Mankind which predicted a
"third Gospel" and in so doing renewed again the dreams of medi-
aeval thinkers. In a much more pronounced way Hegel applied to
historical events the principle of the synthesis of thesis and antithe-
sis. All this was not unknown to Ibsen and must have been in his
mind, particularly during his stay in Germany when preparations
for his Julian dramas were in progress. Here he had firm ground
under his feet, and he believed that he had at last succeeded in
obtaining that "positive world conception" which his critics often
missed in him.^"* For him the ideal of future mankind weaves itself
out of "both life-forms" which have to be reconciled. For this
'Letter to Hegel, June 12th, 1871.
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observer, the infinite wealth of individual possibilities reduces itself
to two types. As representative of one Brand may stand ; and for
the other—well, that most severe of ascetics, Brand himself, says
with shining eyes: "Silen is a splendid figure, the drunkard." Be-
tween enjoyment and renunciation ; between overflowing Dionysiac
devotion to the good things of the world and blissful physical repro-
ductive power on the one hand, and bitter self-mastery and disci-
pline of the will on the other, life moves. There here emerges,
besides the psychological, a historical and ethical separation in the
sense of German idealism. Heinrich Heine's thoughts about the
union of Hellenism and Nazarethism have met, in Ibsen, with Less-
ing's, Schiller's, and Hegel's ideas : and thus arose his great separa-
tion between the first realm which culminated in Greek civilization
but was founded on the tree of Knowledge in paradise, and the sec-
ond realm which sprang from the Cross. The whole, true, genuine
man, as the present can produce him, the man to whom Ibsen is
able to say "yes," can belong to the one realm as well as to the other
:
for both realms still exist among us. But he is, in all his power,
one-sided and therefore only half man. Completion is not achieved
by swaying between the two goals as millions show, drunkards as
well as Philistines : these are merely attempts of mankind gone
wrong. To reach the highest synthesis, the true equilibrium, a third
realm must arise : the realm of deep mystery that shall be founded
both on the tree of Knowledge and on the Cross because it loves
and hates them both, and because it has its living source both in the
garden of Eden and on Golgotha." ^* Up to now the redeemed who
could guide mankind from youth to the maturity of man, has not
come. But Ibsen is determined to hope for him. There are two
possibilities: one, that in every individual both sense and spirit may
attain perfect balance. So the principle of individual being, which
continuously develops personality according to its own laws (through
quite a special blending of the elements, and with special main and
subsidiary accentuations) would be broken through. Ibsen was
rather thinking of the other possibility : of the ideal human society
where both great types, each manifesting itself in infinite ways,
would unite for fruitful work. In this, and only in this, sense was
he ready to acknowledge a "union," when it pursued real cultural
problems ;^^ otherwise he hated every society and all party combina-
''* Emperor and Galilean, I. Part III act. Cf. also R. Ingert's H. Ibsen,
messenger of the third realm. Vaigtlander. 1920.
i' Sneech at the meeting of the Swedish Authors' Society at Stockholm,
April 11th, 1898.
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tions. How such a united working would take effect in practice,
Ibsen never described, nor wished to describe. Every imaginative
flight however daring would have been held down by the empirically
possible. In reality the doctrine of the third realm was less the cen-
tral thought of Ibsen than a sedative for a longing which stirs up
the soul so profoundly and wdiich reaches towards the infinite. It
signifies, further, that the eternally separated lines of both the great
life-forms (with their monstrous one-sidednesses) will meet some-
time in infinite space. Thus every one-sided life-form (be it never
so powerful) ever strives towards its completion by the other life-
form—though it cannot in reality reach it without injuring itself.
To the ceaselessly striving personal life-principle of Ibsen there an-
swers from the last unsatisfied depths of his soul, a harmonious
conceptual aim ; but it is far enough distant not to be able to assuage
the conflict of his real life. Ibsen's true life-form—that of the mas-
ter-man seeking to train himself and others to life according to their
individual laws, and even helped towards this goal by art—is in no
way affected. ^^
16 Translated by A. Makowen. • . . •
